When any Court makes a decision to issue
a custodial sentence it does not do so lightly.
If a person’s freedom is at risk then a high level of proof is required
to justify removing that freedom. In
family cases, a custodial sentence can be issued if, for example, one party is
in contempt of Court by failing to provide information under a Court Order or
by failing to make payments in accordance with the terms of a financial order. The Court will always give the party in
contempt an opportunity to purge themselves of that contempt by providing the
information or making the payment within a reasonable deadline. If the party still does not comply then a
custodial sentence can be imposed. In
the case of non-payment the payee can make an application for a judgment
summons and the Court will consider whether a short custodial sentence is
appropriate for the defaulting party. The Court will not take such a step
unless it is satisfied that the defaulting party has the means to pay, or had
the means when the payment fell due, and has wilfully or neglectfully not paid.
One might expect the same high standard of proof to apply to this test as in
criminal proceedings however that is not the case.
These were:
In the case of Magliaccio v Magliaccio [2016] EWHC 1055 (Fam), a former wife made an application for a
judgment summons in respect of arrears of child maintenance and an unpaid costs
order. The parties were divorced and a
financial order had been made in which the husband was to pay the wife
maintenance for herself and their child by way of periodical payments. The husband had failed to pay and arrears of
£64,000 had accrued. The wife had
returned the matter to Court for enforcement and it was during those
proceedings that a settlement was reached and a further order was made. The new order stated that the husband was to
pay a total of £19,000 consisting of £13,500 for the outstanding maintenance
payments and £5,500 towards the wife’s costs.
There was also to be continued child maintenance of £1,150 per month
with maintenance for the wife dropping to a nominal level.
The husband paid the £13,500 for the
arrears but did not pay the sum ordered for the wife’s costs. He also took it upon himself to reduce the
periodical payments for the child below the level ordered. The wife once again returned the matter to
Court and by the time it came before Mr Justice Mostyn further arrears of
£4,100 had accrued. The husband did
provide an explanation, by way of email, as to why he had not made the
payments. He claimed that he was facing financial hardship because he was soon
to be made redundant and because he had recently remarried. He also thought
that he should not have to pay maintenance for the month that the child visited
him. Significantly, the husband failed to supply any evidence to substantiate
his position.
Mostyn J was not impressed. He said,
referring to the husband’s e-mails:
“These writings show a profound
misunderstanding of obligations under an Order of a Court of law. An Order of a Court of law which provides the
child periodical payments is not some indicative suggestion; it is a judgment
that must be complied with.
By the husband’s writings he seems to believe
that because he has in mind that there are circumstances which might justify a
variation application that he is entitled unilaterally to reduce the payments
to what he thinks is just; not what the Court has determined to be just. This is completely unacceptable and if
such behaviour were to be tolerated it would strike at the very heart of the
rule of law.” (paras 17 & 18)
Mostyn J went on to consider the legal
position in relation to the judgment summons for non-payment of periodical
payments. Specifically, he considered Section
5 of the Debtors Act 1869 which sets out that a person may only be punished
by imprisonment in relation to certain specified unpaid debts. Mostyn J satisfied
himself that non-payment of periodical payments ordered in the context of
matrimonial proceedings were enforceable in this way. This was by virtue of paragraph 2A ofSchedule 8 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970.
Mostyn J had previously considered this very
issue in the case of Bhura v Bhura [2013] 2 FLR 44 in which he noted
that the Court of Appeal had provided principles to consider in the case of Karoonianv CMEC [2012] EWCA Civ 1379 which he was bound to follow. He specifically
identified two principles as being relevant which he set out are set in his Judgment.
These were:
“It
is essential that the Applicant adduces sufficient evidence to establish at
least a case to answer. Generally speaking, this need not be an elaborate
exercise. Proof of the Order and of
non-payment will likely give rise to that inference which establishes the case
to answer”; and
“If
the Applicant establishes a case to answer and evidential burden shifts to the
Respondent to answer it if he fails to discharge that evidential burden then
the terms of Section 5 will be found proved against him or her to a requisite
standard”.
(para. 23)
This may seem straightforward
and sensible in light of circumstances where there has clearly been a failure
to pay. However, in the very recent case of Prest
v Prest [2016] 1 FLR 773 Lord Justice McFarlane made some comments which
brought these principles into doubt.
McFarlane LJ’s concern was that when
considering issuing a custodial sentence for non-payment it was not sufficient
to rely upon findings in family proceedings as these would have been made to a
civil standard of proof (balance of probabilities) rather than a criminal
standard (beyond reasonable doubt).
McFarlane LJ pointed out that if the case to answer had been proven then
it must be decided whether the Respondent has had since the date of the
Judgment the means to pay the sum due and whether he had refused or neglected
to pay the sum. He said that this should
be proved to the criminal standard and that the burden of proof should at all
times remain on the Applicant. He went
even further to say that the Respondent could not be compelled to give
evidence.
Mostyn J considered McFarlane LJ’s
comments and rejected them outright. He
pointed out that the consequences of McFarlane LJ’s approach would be that
every fact would need to be proved from scratch to a much higher standard than had
been required in the original proceedings.
Mostyn J satisfied himself that he had relied on binding principles from
the Court of Appeal and relied on comments from Lord Justice Richards who had,
in Karoonian v CMEC, considered the issue from a human rights
perspective. He stated that, in cases where there was clearly a case to answer
there would be an evidential burden on the Defendant to answer it and that was
unobjectionable to Article 6 (referring to the right to a fair trial as set out
in the European Convention on Human Rights). In following this approach Mostyn J made it
quite clear that the criminal standard of proof is not required in order to make
a committal order for a breach of non-payment of periodical payments in
matrimonial proceedings.
It is difficult to see how MacFarlane
LJ’s approach would not bring the entire system of enforcement to a grinding
halt. It would lead to extensive enforcement proceedings that could require
evidential investigation above and beyond what had been required to make the
original order, a re-trial to a higher standard.
Perhaps the nature of financial evidence
in family proceedings is also relevant. In the earlier enforcement proceedings,
the husband had provided the evidence which the Court had relied on to
determine that the husband did indeed have the means to pay the maintenance,
his Form E. The husband had completed this himself and signed a statement of
truth to confirm the contents were accurate. The husband had disclosed in this
form that he held significant funds and the email evidence he had presented
prior to the judgment summons hearing did nothing to address that but simply
stated that he did not think he should pay because of an impending redundancy
and further financial hardship by virtue of the fact that he had recently
remarried. Mostyn J therefore had no hesitation in imposing a suspended 14 day
custodial sentence on the husband.
Mostyn J has given a definitive answer
on the issue of the burden and standard of proof in these circumstances. However,
should care be taken when considering how to deal with these issues
particularly in light of the increase in Litigants in Person who might not
appreciate the evidential requirements on them or the serious consequences of
failing to discharge that burden? The husband in this case was unrepresented
and had presented a case without due reference to the legal principles being
considered. He may have had “a profound
misunderstanding” of the obligations under a Court Order but had he
received legal advice he might have been able to correctly address these and
avoid the committal order being made against him. Again, this needs to be
balanced against the unquestionable need to ensure that parties comply with
Court Orders.
As usual, comments are welcome.